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From the Ground Truth Up:  




Recent AI ethics has focused on applying abstract principles downward to practice. This 
paper moves in the other direction. Ethical insights are generated from the lived 
experiences of AI-designers working on tangible human problems, and then cycled 
upward to influence theoretical debates surrounding these questions: 1) Should AI as 
trustworthy be sought through explainability, or accurate performance? 2) Should AI be 
considered trustworthy at all, or is reliability a preferable aim? 3) Should AI ethics be 
oriented toward establishing protections for users, or toward catalyzing innovation? 
Specific answers are less significant than the larger demonstration that AI ethics is 
currently unbalanced toward theoretical principles, and will benefit from increased 
exposure to grounded practices and dilemmas. 
 
Keywords 





1. Philosophy Department, Pace University, New York, USA 
2. Signals and Interactive Systems Lab, Department of Information Engineering and 








Artificial intelligence is knowledge produced from pattern recognition, which 
contrasts with the Kantian vision of human knowledge as created from sequential 
reasoning. This distinction at – and as – the source of understanding itself means AI 
cannot be relied upon to obey human conventions of rationality. So, an ethics is 
needed to domesticate the machines.   
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Initial work has been largely theoretical, with 84 sets of principles introduced in the 
last several years, and more on the way. They accumulate along with a challenge. 
Morley, Floridi, Kinsey and Elhalal (2020) write that these abstract principles 
urgently require effective translation for application in concrete reality. About that, 
they are right, but not completely: the gap between theory and practice also implies 
complementary investigating in the other direction. Instead of descending from 
principles to practice, these explorations start from palpable human experiences and 
only subsequently climb to abstraction and the theoretical work of comparing and 
justifying principles.  
 
This report covers the initial phase of that grounded process, the birth of insight and 
ethical propositions from philosophers, engineers, and medical doctors laboring to 
make AI work for flesh and blood patients. As for these emergent and speculative 
propositions, there is no pretension here to defend them against the rules promulgated 
by today’s institutional powers, the ambition is only to demonstrate how ethics can 
surge from men and women struggling with algorithms and statistics. 
 
2. Cases 
Going from practice to principles starts with cases. The two discussed here were 
produced by a team of philosophers, computer scientists, lawyers, and doctors 
organized out of the Frankfurt Big Data Lab in Germany (Zicari et al. 2021a, Zicari et 
al. 2021b). Working with algorithmic startup companies, we collaboratively explore 
their development experiences, with attention split between ethics, technology, law, 
and medicine (Brusseau 2020). 
 
Our skin lesion case started with a team led by Andreas Dengel and their solution to a 
debility currently afflicting artificial intelligence diagnoses of skin cancer. Typically, 
a skin lesion image is analyzed by a neural network to predict whether the lesion is 
malignant. The procedure is noninvasive, quick, and, in terms of accuracy, machines 
are now outperforming well-trained dermatologists (Brinker et al. 2019). Still, the 
technology’s use remains limited. The obstacle is the AI blackbox (Lucieri et al. 
2020). Doctors may be convinced that the image analysis generally works better than 
their own eyes and experience, but because there is no way to know how the machine 
reached its conclusion in any particular case, they constantly fear their patient may be 
an outlier. While aberrations are statistically improbable, there is no escaping the 
startling errors accompanying advances in image recognition technology. There is 
even a narrow research area dedicated to provoking comedically wrong outputs, like 
bananas mistaken for toasters (Brown et al. 2017).  
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The result is that the barrier to AI-fortified skin health is not technological advance so 
much as doctors’ confidence. And that apprehension converted into a business 
opening for Dengel and his team. Their Explainable AI in Dermatology product – 
exAID – wraps around existing artificial intelligence diagnoses and translates the AI 
method into traditional medical language and reasoning (Lucieri et al. 2020). With the 
AI processing explained, dermatologists may confirm or reject the mechanical 
diagnosis in their own human terms, and so conclude with sufficient confidence to 
recommend action. Technology that was accurate but neglected now becomes 
practically useful. 
 
The other case starts from cardiac arrest in Denmark, and with a team lead by Stig 
Nikolaj Blomberg (Blomberg et al. 2021). They responded to an urgent question: 
Could AI eavesdrop on frantic 112 calls – the European 911 – and perceive humanly 
imperceptible clues that the subject was suffering cardiac arrest as opposed to some 
less urgent malady? The information is crucial as cardiac arrest requires specific and 
immediate treatment, even from bystanders since every minute without resuscitation 
increases fatality probability by about 10% (Murphy et al. 1994). Dispatchers at 
Denmark’s Emergency Medical Center were failing to identify 25% of the incoming 
cardiac arrest calls, and so losing precious opportunities to provide the caller with 
instructions in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (Blomberg et al. 2019).  
 
To save lives, Blomberg’s group developed a machine learning tool to detect cardiac 
arrest and then alert Dispatchers with a light added to their console. When the 
technology was implemented, it produced unsurprising and also surprising results. 
Unsurprisingly, true cardiac arrest was recognized more frequently and quickly by the 
artificial intelligence than by its human partner (Zicari et al. 2021a). However, the 
machine was also less specific: the AI returned many false positive alerts which were 
largely ignored by the dispatchers.  This leads to the surprising result. The dispatchers 
also largely ignored the true positive alerts. They ignored the AI almost entirely. 
Dejectedly, Blomberg concluded: “While a machine learning model recognized a 
significantly greater number of out-of-hospital cardiac arrests than dispatchers alone, 
this did not translate into improved cardiac arrest recognition by dispatchers” 
(Blomberg et al. 2021). 
 
3. Explainability or Performance? 
At the highest level, European AI ethics is dedicated to creating technology that is 
trustworthy (HLEG 2019). Both cases confronted that trust problem, but the project 
leaders diverged on the question underneath: why believe in algorithmic conclusions 
From the Ground Truth Up: Doing AI Ethics from Practice to Principles       4 
 
in the first place? This uncertainty is not so much about how much confidence exists, 
but on what the confidence is built. The distinction divided the teams fundamentally.   
 
Dengel’s exAID product builds trust from explainability: machine image analysis will 
be accepted when it is understood. Consequently, his AI wrapper is built to show how 
skin images are classified, and to verify that the processing functions through disease-
related concepts similar to those employed by conventional dermatologists. The key 
is to translate away from the statistics and probabilities and into seven clinical skin 
characteristics perceived through close visual inspection. They are: Typical Pigment 
Network, Atypical Pigment Network, Streaks, Regular Dots and Globules, Irregular 
Dots and Globules, Blue Whitish Veil (Lucieri et al. 2020, Argenziano et al. 1998). 
The presence of these telling traits is quantified by exAID, and then overlayed on the 
image of the skin lesion under scrutiny before being returned to the dermatologist. 
What is significant here is that the outputted numbers do not replace the images with 
an objective result, instead, they describe the images, they direct doctors’ attention 
back to specific visual evidence so they can check for themselves. Without the exAID 
wrapper, all a dermatologist receives is a cold numerical probability sent back in 
return for submitted images. With the wrapper, the statistics no longer substitute skin 
pictures, they enhance them.  
 
In essence, machine learning reverses: instead of the material world converting into a 
digital score, the score guides a way back into material experience. Numbers serve 
eyes, not the other way around. 
 
The original skin lesion picture also receives a second overlay, a layer of color 
indicating exactly where the AI detected the information resulting in diagnosis. So, 
the doctor learns not only of a blue whitish veil, but precisely where on the lesion it 
can be found. Here again, explaining the AI does not mean adding still more digital 
information or another set of statistical methods (Shapley values or similar) to 
approximate which pieces of data contributed how much to prior statistical processing 
(Chen 2021). Instead, explaining means translating the experience of interacting with 
the system into familiar and human modes of seeing, locating, touching. The machine 
is humanized, anthropomorphized. 
 
In Denmark, a different strategy: instead of understanding, Blomberg and his team 
leveraged power. AI performance imposed trust. To force dispatcher respect for the 
cardiac arrest alerts, the machine was tuned to defeat humans. While it is true that an 
abundance of false positive alerts got logged along the way, the hard fact remained 
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that true cardiac arrest was detected faster by algorithms and data than by human 
listening and experience.  
 
The idea of helping the human dispatchers catch up with the AI instead of leaving 
them behind – perhaps by developing software to clarify or augment the audio the 
dispatchers heard – was never broached in discussions with our group. Just the 
opposite, we learned that as the AI progressed, humanity reduced. Originally, the AI 
processed the raw audio of calls, thick with their anguish. However, the discovery 
was made that background screams and lamentations were major sources of false 
positive alerts, and so a two-stage approach was developed. An initial filter 
eliminated human emotion by transcribing the calls into dry words, and then a second 
process analyzed the text for patterns in vocabulary, in sentences, in questions and 
answers, and in specific, described characteristics. Blomberg explained that if the 
caller states that the subject is unconscious, then the probability of cardiac arrest rises. 
If blue lips are mentioned, the probability also rises. If both, the alarm illuminates 
(Zicari et al. 2021a). However, beyond that and a few similar anecdotes, there was no 
human-oriented discussion of the AI process, nothing that would make sense to a 
doctor. There were only the statistical outcomes of sensitivity (the detection of 
cardiac arrest) and specificity (the ratio of true cardiac arrests detected, against false 
alerts), and how they could be improved.  
 
Though the model was partially open-sourced (Havtorn et al. 2020; Maaløe et al. 
2019), our group did not pursue a technical understanding of explaining how the 
system worked because we were convinced that winning human trust for the AI 
decisions would originate and remain within the parameters of performance defined 
as speed and accuracy. Ultimately, the objectivity – the mathematical certainties – 
were not just descriptions of functionality but conceptual rigidities that commanded 
respect by humiliating human subjectivity and uncertainty. While emergency call 
dispatchers considered and doubted and floundered and let seconds pass through their 
indecision, hard numbers responded. The result for the emergency call AI technology 
was a kind of trust not won from dispatchers so much as stamped onto them. As 
opposed to the previous case which drew human explanations from an inanimate 
machine, here, the power of inanimate machines was programmed to crush human 
doubts.  
 
In actual practice in Copenhagen the dispatchers were not crushed, they resisted by 
ignoring the technological prompts. But that failure does not change the nature of the 
strategy, it only requires still more engineering and perfecting. 
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Which of the two paths to trustworthy AI is recommendable? Is it explainability so 
that the machine will be understood well, or accurate performance so the machine 
will work well? The case for explainability flourished in German dermatologists’ 
offices: it was because the skin analyzing machine was finally understood well, that it 
was allowed to work well. 
 
In the Danish emergency call center, a different choice was unavoidable. Faced with 
the reality that dispatchers were ignoring cardiac arrest alerts, Blomberg could only 
tune his machine still tighter, and press his mechanical advantage still harder because 
he knew that death hung on seconds. This is the stark reality he faced: No time to 
draw attention to keywords, or to describe what was revealing in sentence patterns. 
No time to explain what linguistic cues triggered an alert, or even to determine 
whether there could be any explanation. The AI’s flashing light could only present 
dispatchers a decision to be made instantaneously, or to be made for them while they 
hesitated. In that way, cardiac arrest telephone calls resemble one-way airplane 
tickets and romantic passions and so many of the reasons we want to be alive in the 
first place: if you stop to ask why, it is already too late.  
 
For his part, Dengel’s skin lesion team reminded our group of the General Data 
Protection Regulation stipulation that data subjects possess a right to explanation for 
any automated decision made by computer algorithms (Lucieri 2020). That will have 
to change, though, because no one has the responsibility to try the impossible, and the 
cardiac arrest case demonstrates that under time’s pressure and on the edge splitting 
life from death the only functional source for trust in AI technology is power as 
demonstrated by performance. The machine is faster than humans. Which means that 
the proposal of a right to an explanation for an algorithmically generated decision is 
cancelled by the demands of life itself – not just that patients stay alive, but that life 
with AI is worth living.  
 
Still, the question remains: Where does the line get drawn? In which instances should 
trust be built on humanized knowledge about AI decisions? And, when should trust 
be sought through algorithmic power? More cases will need to be studied, but what 
these two indicate is that when the moment is critical and the risk is high, power is 
better than knowledge. 
 
4. Trustworthy or Reliable? 
Trustworthy AI is the titular goal of European Commission publications on AI ethics, 
but should it be? Joanna Bryson (2018) and Mark Ryan (2020) advocate for a shift 
toward inanimate reliability, and that transition gains support from ground-up work, 
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from investigating that begins from sincere psychological attitudes and bare human 
experiences.  
 
This is bare experience: trust is inseparable from betrayal. If there was no dishonesty 
or infidelity than we would not need the concept of trustworthiness. We would not 
even have it, we could not have it. As Derrida (1998) has demonstrated, these kinds 
of dialectic word pairings are not just opposites or contrasts, they are episodes of co-
dependence. Each requires the other in order to produce linguistic meaning. The 
simplest example may be honesty and lies: if no one ever told the truth, it would be 
impossible to invent the word or even the idea of lying. This paradox explains why no 
one calls actors liars even while we are absorbed in the lies their characters tell. And 
it explains the peculiar linguistic experience called bullshitting according to Frankfurt 
(2005): words and claims that are neither truths nor lies, just absurdities. 
 
In lived experience, the fundamental distinction is not between trust on one side and 
betrayal on the other. Instead, it is between a reality of trust entwined with betrayal on 
one side, and other realities without either one. As machines are enveloped in 
language, they too are subjected to the distinction: both or neither. 
 
It is easy to write that trustworthiness is attractive and that deceit is repellent, but 
judging from how we live, any neutral observer would conclude the opposite: 
deception and dishonesty are alluring. The evidence is everywhere, but most 
immediately in our movies and literature, in the places where we choose to spend our 
time. We are drawn to infidelity while scrolling Netflix, we seek deceit while 
standing in front of the bookracks at the airport. And if these quotidian examples are 
too crass, then there is the arousal Shakespeare summons from his audience as Brutus 
plunges his dagger into Caesar’s back. It is not a psychotic delight in blood, but the 
thrill of betrayal captured in Caesar’s recognition that it was Brutus too, not just 
callous assassins driven impersonally by thirst for power. All of this, finally, is 
inseparable from trustworthiness, it is the way the word and concept gain meaning. 
And all those who venerate the trustworthy are equally engaged by the dark 
complements, whether they admit it or not. 
 
It follows that if machines are going to be trusted, if we are going to talk and write 
about them that way, there is a requirement – a condition of the possibility of being 
trustworthy – that they also betray. If the machine wins our trust when it works well, 
then the machine’s failures are not sites of error so much as scenes of unfaithfulness. 
The AI that falsely signals a cardiac arrest to an emergency dispatcher is not wrong, it 
is duplicitous, and the result should not be disappointment, but guilt. 
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That never happens, though. Not remotely. In our group’s extensive work with two 
very different startups trying to promote trustworthy AI, not once did a single ethicist, 
engineer, lawyer, or doctor define false outputs as dishonesty, infidelity, deception, 
lies, betrayal. No one invoked the idea of being tempted by a false positive. It 
occurred to no one to propose that the light on the emergency call dashboard was 
winking, trying to lure the dispatcher’s attention and seduce with insincere promises. 
When the machine was wrong, it was just wrong, that was all.     
 
Ultimately, the problem with trustworthy AI – and the reason the idea should be 
abandoned for the neutral and inanimate term of reliability – is not that we cannot 
force ourselves as humans to trust the machines. Probably, we can. The problem is 
what waits on the other side of that trust: mechanical duplicity. So, even if we grant 
that algorithms could be trustworthy, a complete understanding of what that means 
requires that we also acknowledge engaging with the acidic joys of betrayal. For the 
human experience of encountering AI today, that joy is inconceivable. 
 
Finally, and stated positively, the way we speak in the real world when machines fail 
dictates the way we must respond when they succeed. With failure, we feel 
disappointment, and we talk about error and incorrect outputs. We speak about the 
opposite of reliability. With success, consequently the decision is already made: AI 
can be reliable, but not trustworthy. 
 
5. Protection or Performance? 
A sentence with jarring implications appears near the end of our group’s report on the 
Copenhagen emergency call case: 
 
Under the forthcoming Medical Device Regulation in the EU, the AI system will 
be classified as medical device, and it would therefore need EC-certification 
(Zicari et al. 2021a). 
 
Blomberg would not have been able to initiate his experiment today. Medically 
certifying the AI would swamp development in regulations, permissions, approvals, 
and ethical safeguards. One obstacle would be the General Data Protection 
Regulation, and for good reason: the telephone calls are tortured. A victim collapses 
in agonal wheezing, loved ones frantically seek a reason as the lips tint blue. No one 
knows what to do and gawking onlookers deepen the helplessness. In the disorienting 
environment of cardiac arrest, some people will lose control over themselves. Others 
will maintain control but have no idea how to exhibit their own identity. Either way, 
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regulatory protections promulgated for personal information in the ethical region of 
human dignity were crafted for these moments. This is when privacy matters. If tragic 
emergency calls are not shielded from the commodification of machine learning, it is 
difficult to imagine what human experience could possibly be considered protected.  
 
But commodification works. The machine recognizes cardiac arrest and lives can be 
saved.  
 
The dilemma is bottomless, and another example of why seeking absolute answers to 
legitimate ethical questions is misguided. Genuine ethics aims for the limit where it is 
simultaneously true that it is impossible to decide, and a decision must be made. 
Blomberg was there, faced the impossibility, and decided. AI development 
proceeded. 
 
In 2019, Tesla disabled major components of its Autopilot feature in nations where 
UN/ECE r79 vehicle safety regulations were promulgated (Lambert 2019). The 
restrictions embodied a commitment to safeguard against artificial intelligence harms 
and risks, even at the cost of advances in AI development and application (Roberts 
2021: 1). They also foreshadowed the regulatory paradox that Blomberg initially 
escaped, but now cannot. More regulation equals less regulating because innovation 
is stymied until there is nothing left to restrict.  
 
It does not need to be that way. AI ethics can be reconceived to catalyze innovation. 
The direct strategy is to credit ethically – not just technically and economically – AI 
that performs well. The proposal is that performance is a value, and it emerges for 
this reason. One of the most frustrating aspects of our group’s interactions with 
Dengel’s skin lesion team and Blomberg’s cardiac arrest group was that we found no 
way to unambiguously account for their pure engineering accomplishments. 
Instrumental value was easy to locate: both technologies are worth having for the 
indirect reason that they save lives. There is something more than that, though. The 
skin lesion explainability wrapper and the cardiac arrest language filter each stand on 
their own – without regard for their human benefits – as small but identifiable 
triumphs of design. Some AI engineers grasp this with the concept of code quality 
(Spinellis 2008), but regardless of the term, in our group’s experience it explained the 
disjunction between AI doing, and what is done. Performance runs along that first 
vector, not the second, and along the performance scale elevating levels of quality 
become increasingly rewarding regardless of what is done. In AI ethics from the 
ground up, pure performance is a value because algorithmic designers find that high 
quality is worth having on its own. 
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There is a parallel here with functionalist architecture, like the Bauhaus or Pompidou 
Center. For those buildings, functionality transcends its native role and becomes 
form. The buildings’ inner workings – the stairways and waterpipes – are its 
decoration. Analogously for AI that functions well, the practical transcends its 
instrumental role and becomes an end in itself. So, AI that is worth doing because of 
what it does well (serves doctors and patients) becomes AI that is worth doing 
because it does well. The ethical value of performance is intrinsic.   
 
Weighing performance in a vacuum is dangerous. There is no end to the human 
catastrophes occasioned by exquisitely functioning machines, and advocating pure 
performance as an ethical value requires acknowledging this: even death-mechanisms 
like nuclear bombs can be majestic accomplishments, awesome, with all that word 
implies. The best descriptor may be Kant’s sense of the sublime, the feeling of 
reason’s power and superiority over nature (Kant 1987: §28). In this way, 
performance as a value resembles philosophical approaches to painted art: there is a 
transcendent dimension to its existence, one that escapes the chemical composition of 
the oils applied to the canvas, and the money generated or lost, and the history of the 
work’s transfer from one to another owner. There is an escape from the effects the 
work produces as a material object. 
 
It is difficult to credit that escape with today’s conventional AI ethics. The escape is 
particularly elusive for those working inside the European Commission’s Ethics 
Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. The Guidelines does include the value of accuracy, 
but it is buried deep in the document, underneath the four pillars and then within the 
category of Technical Robustness and Safety (HLEG 2019: 17). Defined dryly as the 
“ability to make correct judgements,” the idea of simple accuracy is as narrow as it is 
desiccated. Performance is expansive. In the cardiac arrest case, quickness was as 
critical as accuracy. In the skin lesion case, the output’s elegance was as encouraging 
as the raw calculations of correct predictions. AI that performs well is not only 
correct and accurate but agile and graceful. 
 
As drawn from our working experience, the four traits of performance as a value in 
AI ethics are: 
• Intrinsically valuable: The only justification required is engineering 
excellence. 
• Independent: The technology is evaluated without regard for its material 
effects on humans, or the world. 
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• Expansive: The ingredients of performance – what counts as success – cannot 
be known, defined, or checklisted beforehand any more than the qualities of 
venerated art can be named before the work is done. The dimensions of 
accomplishment are only appreciated after the culmination.  
• Balancing: Performance can counter ethical shortcomings. An AI tool that 
performs flawlessly, for example, does not need to be explainable or 
transparent.  
 
The central significance of performance as a value is that it transforms the role of AI 
ethics: it fundamentally reorients mainstream approaches as they are represented by 
the EC Ethics Guidelines. The Guidelines places the burden on developers to show 
that their products are trustworthy, which implies fulfilling requirements including 
those established to protect personally identifying information. Only then will 
innovations like Blomberg’s emergency call AI be approved for work out in the 
world. The addition of Performance – accuracy, speed, elegance – to the first line of 
AI ethics can reverse the priorities. If a machine functions sufficiently well, then it is 
the regulators who carry the burden of showing why the technology should be 
constrained. Because creative engineering is understood as intrinsically good and 
worth pursuing, the burden for justifying restrictions falls toward the restrictors.  
 
Instead of the creators proving themselves to regulators, now it is regulators who 
must prove to creators.  
 
In some cases, the proving will be easy and the addition of performance to AI ethics 
imperceptible. Take the example of social media recommendation algorithms attuned 
to maximize users’ angers and frustration. In that case, like so many others, the ethics 
of individual human autonomy and collective social welfare easily overcomes the 
value of the predictive analytics accomplishment. Just because the machine works 
does not mean it should be built. In close calls, however, in cases resembling the 
cardiac arrest AI where real human dangers weigh against significant benefits, the 
accomplishment of the machine itself may prove decisive. If there is no way to be 
certain beforehand whether an AI ultimately helps or harms humanity, and if the 
technology performs, then that value endorses and potentially justifies pushing ahead, 
through the unknown. 
 
Ultimately, there are two conceptions of AI ethics, one without and the other with 
performance as a value. One postures defensively against risks. The other leans 
forward to catalyze opportunities. There will be no way to know which is preferable 
until it is too late, just as there are no obviously right or wrong places to draw the line 
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between AI ethics as protecting humanity from innovation, and AI ethics as 
stimulating more of it. But there are different places.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In the beginning of philosophy Plato taught that ethics was about purification: 
knowledge became truer as it increased in abstraction and decreased in humanity. The 
light-headedness of intellectual exploration was better than the buzz of wine, the 
desire for mathematics more passionate than sex. The premise of this paper is that 
Platonic urges have limited AI ethics. Overbalancing principles against practice 
forces us to believe that we only need to get the abstract, sterile theory right, and then 
application in the slippery world will come as an afterthought. 
 
This essay is an exercise in reversing the thinking: instead of learning about the world 
by escaping upward from it, knowledge is produced by diving down into the work of 
real AI developers as they crash into human dilemmas. Readers will draw varied 
conclusions about explainability and performance, and about trustworthiness and 
reliability, and about the intrinsic value of innovation, but the underlying assertion is 
that those conclusions will emerge stronger from the ground of lived human 
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